



Technical Report for the Karamoja Development Partners Group

THE 2022 HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN KARAMOJA, UGANDA: A REAL-TIME REVIEW

November 2022

The authors of the review report are Adrian Cullis and Raphael Lotira Arasio.

This real-time review was undertaken at the request
of the Karamoja Development Partners Group

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KARAMOJA RESILIENCE SUPPORT UNIT
The 2022 Humanitarian Crisis in Karamoja,
Uganda: A real-time review

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ACRONYMS

AAW	African armyworm
AFI	Andre Foods International
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSLZ	Central Sorghum and Livestock Zone
DDMC	District Disaster Management Committee
DRM	Disaster risk management
EU	European Union
EWS	Early warning system
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FGD	Focus group discussion
FMD	Food and mouth disease
GAM	Global acute malnutrition
HCT	Humanitarian Coordination Team
HH	Household
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
KDPG	Karamoja Development Partners Group
KIDP	Karamoja Integrated Development Plan
KII	Key informant interview
KNHPC	Karamoja Nutrition and Health Partners Coordination
KRSU	Karamoja Resilience Support Unit
LDU	Local Defence Unit
LEGS	Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards
MAM	Moderate acute malnutrition
MERS	Minimum Economic Recovery Standards
MfKA	Ministry for Karamoja Affairs
MP	Member of Parliament
MRDPR	Ministry of Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees
NDRMP	National Disaster Risk Management Plan
NECOC	National Emergency Coordination and Operations Centre
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NPDPM	National Policy for Disaster Preparedness and Management
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
Pro-ACT	Pro-Resilience Action project funded by the European Union
SAM	Severe acute malnutrition
S/C	Sub-county
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMA	Uganda National Meteorological Authority
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force
Ushs	Uganda shillings (US\$1 = Ushs 3,815 at the time of the study)
US\$	United States dollar
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme

FOREWORD

Over recent years the humanitarian and development communities have learned that building resilience and responding early to mitigate the impact of shocks and protect livelihoods not only prevents humanitarian disasters on a larger scale, but also enables affected populations to recover more quickly. Evidence even suggests that rapid, early action not only protects lives and livelihoods, but can reduce the overall cost of managing disasters. But for at least the past 30 years, we have also repeatedly witnessed the scenario that early warning systems predict a shock (or more likely, multiple shocks affecting a given population at once) and yet the response in terms of early action to mitigate the shock—or even just the humanitarian response to protect human life—is slow. Unfortunately, as this report demonstrates, this has happened again in 2022 in the Karamoja Region of Northeastern Uganda.

To be fair, demands on donors were already high in 2022, with the drivers of crisis including the combined effects of four (now five) poor rainy seasons in the Greater Horn of Africa; conflict in Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Yemen and Nigeria; and the high price of food on global markets even before the invasions of Ukraine, which sent food prices spiraling even higher. This combination of factors has sent the number of acutely food insecure people globally to over 200 million—the highest assessed number on record. But in addition to these global factors which stretched the ability of donors to meet demand everywhere, there were local factors as well. One of them highlighted by this report was the ongoing export of sorghum from Karamoja—even as people in Karamoja were going hungry.

All of this only underlines the need for both prioritization and early action, to limit the impact of crises before the response becomes even more expensive. This report assesses the current situation in Karamoja, analyzes missed opportunities for early intervention, and makes recommendations to government, donors and agencies working in Karamoja (including security forces) to prioritize the response going forward. While opportunities to intervene early may have been missed, focusing on priority areas going forward is imperative.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In July 2022 the Ugandan media reported that 900 people had died of hunger or hunger-related diseases in Karamoja since February 2022, and that 8 out of 10 households had limited or no food. The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) estimated that from a total population of about 1.4 million people, about 518,000 people from Karamoja's poorest families faced critical food insecurity, and of these, 428,000 people were experiencing crisis levels of food insecurity (Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) phase 3), and 90,000 were at emergency levels of food insecurity (IPC phase 4). For the first time in three years, all the nine districts of Karamoja were at crisis level or worse according to IPC classification. In late July 2022 the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) reported the number of fatalities in Karamoja due to the "food insecurity crisis" to be 2,465.

While recognizing that Karamoja has had a turbulent history and has faced long periods of political and economic marginalization, the 10-year period between 2010 and 2019 was relatively peaceful and in part, was characterized by the substantial investment in development programs that has continued to the present day. In 2016 for example, the aid programs of the 10 main donors in Karamoja were valued at United States dollars (US\$) 98.5 million. Given this heavy investment in development aid in the region, why was Karamoja experiencing a humanitarian crisis in 2022? Could the crisis be attributed to COVID-19 restrictions or perhaps the resurgence in violent livestock raiding, evident from 2019?

This real-time review aims to document the events that led to Karamoja's hunger crisis in 2022, the reporting of the worsening situation by early warning systems, and the responses of the Government of Uganda and the international aid community. The review took place from the September 27–October 21, 2022. It involved field assessments in Karamoja and a week of key informant interviews in Kampala. In Karamoja, the review team visited Moroto, Nabilatuk, and Kaabong Districts and conducted focus group discussions in the Central Sorghum and Livestock Zone (CSLZ) that was most affected by the crisis. At community level, information was collected using standardized participatory rural appraisal methods, with triangulation using secondary literature and more than 40 key informants in Karamoja representing local government, and international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The review draws on the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) disaster risk equation to explore the hazards, exposure, vulnerability, and capability in the lives and livelihoods of the people of Karamoja.

Causes of the crisis: immediate and deep-rooted factors

Hazard timelines developed with communities showed that 2019 was a relatively "good year," followed by deepening crisis years, the result of multiple hazards: desert locusts, African armyworm (AAW), other sorghum/crop diseases, agricultural drought, livestock diseases, human diseases, and, in single locations, flood and wild animal damage in gardens. Hazard scores for both 2020 and 2022 were very high, with raiding and insecurity ranked the main driver, followed by agricultural drought, COVID-19 restrictions, and AAW. In 2021, these multiple hazards combined into a complex emergency and a hunger crisis. Key informants confirmed this analysis and reported the impact of fluctuating food and livestock prices and very high lean season food prices, the result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war.

Further details are provided in Section 3 of the report.

How did early warning systems report the crisis?

Different early warning systems (EWS) were evident—customary, sub-regional, national, and international. All, at some level, predicted the current humanitarian crisis in Karamoja. The Nabilatuk Bulletin produced by the Pro-Resilience Action Early Warning System project—implemented by World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)—included for example a recommendation for the use of contingency funds for Lolachat and Lorengedwat sub-counties. This recommendation was scaled up to the whole sub-region in August 2022 with the following: "It is necessary to respond to the impact of last year's poor harvest, which has continued to manifest itself in the form of very low household food stocks. Contingency plans should be activated because the livestock sector continues to be affected by parasites and tick-borne diseases, coupled with raids and livestock theft."

At the national level, the Uganda National Meteorological Authority provided timely alerts of delayed and erratic seasonal rains in 2021 and again in 2022. International service providers—FEWS NET and the IPC group—also produced detailed forecasts from October 2019 onwards of a deepening food security crisis. For example, the April 2022 FEWS NET bulletin reported continued deteriorating food security to IPC 3 or above: 27% of the population in June 2020, 30% in April 2021, and 41% in April 2022. Areas of greatest concern included Kaabong, Kotido, Moroto, and Nabilatuk.

Further details on EWS in Karamoja are provided in Section 4.

What was the humanitarian response?

People's own efforts to manage the crisis are recognized in an analysis of income-generating activities in lean and crisis years. This is followed by details of the humanitarian response, including community reports and official humanitarian dashboards. Overall, the humanitarian response was limited in scope and delayed, and followed reports of hunger-related human deaths by Members of Parliament from Karamoja in the National Parliament. The response focused on human nutrition and health interventions and so may have saved lives. However, there was limited evidence of emergency interventions to support livelihoods and limited-to-no use of international humanitarian standards for economic recovery or livestock-related support. Regardless of the challenges faced by the international humanitarian system, the pace, scale, and sectoral scope of the humanitarian response in Karamoja fell well below the anticipated response as outlined in district multi-hazard contingency plans. There were missed opportunities for large development programs to address spikes in human, livestock, and crop diseases as part of their routine work, and for the pivoting of budgetary resources to the emerging crisis through the innovative use of crisis-modifiers or similar flexible funding arrangements.

Further details are provided in Section 5.

How were humanitarian responses coordinated?

Assorted coordination structures existed at the national level, including the Ministry for Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees and the Ministry for Karamoja Affairs (both in the Office of the Prime Minister), the Karamoja Parliamentary Group, the Karamoja Development Partners Group, and the UN Humanitarian Coordination Team. Within the sub-region, the Karamoja Nutrition and Health Partners Coordination meets monthly in person and virtually. Since the emergency, it now meets weekly in response to the humanitarian crisis. At district level, the District Disaster Management Committees coordinate the work of district departmental heads, the Uganda Red Cross Society, and international and local NGOs active in the district. Despite the coordination capacity in Uganda, at the sub-region and district levels it is evident that coordination and perhaps more importantly leadership has been lacking, and the response is both modest and delayed. Humanitarian resources that have been availed, however, appear to have been well targeted to the most vulnerable.

¹ e.g., see Catley et al., 2018.

² Arasio and Stites, 2022.

³ Stites, 2022.

Further details are provided in section 6.

Conclusions and recommendations

The current nutrition and health-focused “surge” response will doubtless contribute to saving lives in the sub-region. Alone, however, it will not avert the severe food security crisis and associated impacts on livelihoods that informants highlighted during the review. The recent harvest was patchy, and so household food stocks are inadequate; this is exacerbated by the export sale of grain. From the perspective of preventing malnutrition, it is evident that communities themselves prioritize livelihoods support such as livestock-related and income-generating activities,¹ yet such humanitarian support is currently minimal. District hazard-based contingency plans recognize this but, without funding and the support of international development partners, these plans will have limited impact. Furthermore, local government and international and local NGOs need to be fully conversant with humanitarian standards for economic recovery (Minimum Economic Recovery Standards (MERS)) and livestock interventions (Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS)).

While it is evident that more could and should have been done to protect lives and livelihoods in Karamoja, informants make clear that raiding and insecurity are the primary drivers of the current crisis. In areas where conflict is a real risk, people cannot easily own or benefit from livestock, or cultivate and tend their gardens and fields without threat of violence. In these cases, a meaningful humanitarian livelihoods response is very challenging, as are meaningful development programs and investments that are required to address Karamoja's very high levels of multidimensional poverty. The Karamoja Resilience Support Unit (KRSU) has recently released an assessment of the current conflict issues in Karamoja, with an emphasis on community perspectives on the causes, perpetrators, and solutions,² as well as a review of conflict trends and issues over time.³

Recognizing that Karamoja is experiencing a multi-hazard, multi-year humanitarian crisis, the result of a conflagration of high levels of multidimensional poverty, highly eroded household resilience levels, multiple local hazards, and deepening global economic and food crises, the review team offers the following recommendations to prevent a further deepening of the humanitarian crisis in Karamoja.

Humanitarian response and coordination:

- Rapidly expand and extend the mass screening and

treatment of severely acute malnourished children—under the age of 59 months—and mothers in all districts of the sub-region, through to the end of December 2023.

- Expand and extend the protection ration for households with a malnourished child to all sub-locations in the CSLZ.
- Undertake a food availability assessment for the forthcoming lean season. As required, extend the provision of a protective ration of food assistance to those in need.
- Establish a hybrid (in-person and online) Karamoja Emergency Committee, chaired/co-chaired by the Ministry of State for Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees and the Ministry for Karamoja Affairs, that meets every two weeks to coordinate the Karamoja Emergency Response. Each ministry to deploy a Senior Technical Expert in Karamoja to organize monthly in-person meetings in Kotido and Moroto for the northern and southern districts in the sub-region.

Governance and security:

- The Ministry for Karamoja Affairs, the Parliamentary Group, Uganda People's Defence Force, Uganda Police Force, and an independent conflict specialist facilitator form a new High-Level Peace and Reconciliation Taskforce to address raiding, roadside banditry, and excessive use of force by security organs. Among other responsibilities, the Taskforce will be responsible for bringing raiders, community leaders, traders, and security and local government personnel allegedly involved in commercial raiding to account. The Taskforce will report regularly to Government and every two months to an open forum in Kotido and Moroto.
- Representatives of the High-Level Taskforce meet counterparts in Kenya to pilot and institutionalize a Turkana transhumance system that requires Turkana pastoralists who are semi-permanently living in Moroto District to return to Kenya for a minimum of three months each year. Also, negotiations for a return to Ugandan rangelands are predicated on the storage of all weapons in Kenya before the Turkana and their herds are facilitated to cross the international border.
- Relations with neighbors: large numbers of armed Turkana are semi-permanently based in Moroto District. Their bearing arms undermines Government efforts to disarm the sub-region.

Resilience:

- Development programs have substantial resources, but it is unclear if or how these resources are re-shaped during crisis years. In part this is the result of donor accounting processes that are inappropriate in fragile sub-regions such as Karamoja. It is recommended that donors review the objectives and activities of their programming in the light of the poor response to the current crisis and identify, pilot, and institutionalize more-flexible delivery mechanisms, including crisis modifiers.
- The Ministry for Karamoja Affairs, the Karamoja Parliamentary Group, the Uganda Police Force, and an independent substance abuse expert form a joint *Waragi* Control Taskforce. The Taskforce would be responsible for ending the transport and sale of illegal alcohol in Karamoja and for engaging international development partners to expand alcohol support services to affected individuals and their families.
- The Ministry for Karamoja seeks international development partner support for a five-year pilot social protection program for the most vulnerable groups in the sub-region, one which incorporates lessons from other countries for emergency scaling.

Livestock support:

- Specialist livestock departments in government and international livestock organizations undertake a Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS) initial assessment and use the participatory response identification matrix (PRIM) to develop sub-regional and district livestock recovery plans. To be supported, elders and communities at sub-county level would need to commit to an end to livestock raiding and to addressing all violations in customary courts.

Crop support:

- Government and international development partners collaborate to reduce and bring to an end the damaging export of cereals from the sub-region in poor and crisis years through support to local farmer and community groups to bulk and store food for sale within the sub-region.
- While listed as hazards, agricultural drought, crop diseases, and floods are better addressed through development programs. It is recommended that development partners resource a 10-year regenerative agriculture project with the Nabuin Zonal Agricultural Research and Development Institute

(NZARDI) and relevant NGOs to pilot regenerative farming practices appropriate for the CSLZ and “Green Belt.” If proven cost effective, good practice would be scale-up through mentoring support to agricultural extension staff and farmer groups.

I. INTRODUCTION

I.1 THE KARAMOJA SUB-REGION

I.1.1 Livelihoods overview

Located in the far northeast of Uganda, the Karamoja sub-region is administered in nine districts⁴ and has an estimated population of 1.4 million.⁵ While 90% of the population continue to live in rural areas, increasing numbers of people have migrated from the drier east (annual rainfall of 300–400 mm) to the western “Green Belt” (annual rainfall of 1,200 mm). Rainfall has a strong influence on Karamoja’s three main production systems: the pastoral system along the eastern border with Kenya; the agropastoral system in the central parts of Karamoja; and the agricultural production system along the western belt of the region. Karamoja can also be classified in five broad livelihood zones, of which Zones 1 and 5 are identified as the most vulnerable:⁶

1. Northeastern Highland Apiculture Zone;


2. Western Mixed Crop Farming Zone;

3. Southeastern Cattle and Maize Zone;

4. Mountain Slopes Maize and Cattle Zone;

5. Central Sorghum and Livestock Zone.

The Central Sorghum and Livestock Zone (CSLZ) comprises much of central Karamoja (see Map 1) and stretches from Kaabong District in the north to Nabilatuk District in the south. In addition to sorghum, the main crops grown include maize, millet, groundnuts, sunflower, cowpeas, and beans. Home-grown sorghum is consumed by poorer households from September to around March. From April through to the harvest in September, poorer households are increasingly dependent on livestock sales; purchases in local markets; the collection of wild foods, firewood; charcoal production; the consumption of



Map 1. Livelihood zone map of Karamoja (from FEWS NET, 2013).

⁴ Kaabong, Karenga, Kotido, Abim, Moroto, Napak, Nakapiripirit Nabilatuk, and Amudat.

⁵ UBOS, 2022a.

⁶ FEWS NET, 2013.

less-nutritious foods such as the used fermented grains from brewing; the sale of labor; and, in extreme cases, the sale of household items. The better-off group mainly increases the sale of livestock and borrowing. Following extreme events, households move to other districts and sub-regions in Uganda. Peak milk production is during the rainy season (March–September) and reduces in the months of October to December.⁷

The constraints to basic agricultural and livestock production in Karamoja in normal years force many households to engage in diversified livelihood activities that require considerable effort and time but yield limited income.⁸ The overall livelihood context in Karamoja is reflected in food security and nutrition statistics. For example, during the period of relative peace and economic investment between 2010 and 2017—and before COVID-19 restrictions—levels of global acute malnutrition (GAM) increased. For nutrition surveys carried out in June each year during this period, GAM levels increased from 11.5% to 13.8% (a 20% proportional increase), while for nutrition surveys conducted in December each year, GAM increased from 9.8% to 10.4% (a 6% proportional increase).⁹ These increases in GAM rates occurred despite the presence of increasing investment and the delivery of large-scale development programs.

1.1.2 Conflict and development in Karamoja

Karamoja has a checkered administrative history. Under the British, out-migration was prohibited, and entry was allowed only with special permission. The sub-region was subsequently brutalized during Amin's reign. Following his downfall in 1979, Amin's army abandoned the Moroto Barracks and the Karimojong looted the armory. Well-armed, the Karimojong raided half-a-million cattle from neighboring Soroti and Katakwi Districts from 1979 to 2000, and many thousands more from Acholi, Lango, Sebei, and other districts in Teso sub-region.¹⁰ Raiding within Karamoja, insecurity and restricted grazing, sales, and poor animal health services resulted in considerable

losses. Following the poor harvests of 1982, 1984, and 1986–7, years of severe food insecurity and famine ensued.¹¹

In 2001 the President launched a voluntary disarmament campaign.¹² This campaign stalled when the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) was redeployed to the Kony insurgency. Within Karamoja, there followed an intense period of raiding, when the disarmed Karimojong were targeted by those who had retained their weapons. In 2006, Kony relocated to South Sudan, and the UPDF were returned to Karamoja. Unlike the forerunner, this forceful disarmament included the location of army detachments in raiding corridors, daily army patrols, "cordon and search," "protected kraals," and "trace and recovery." Using these methods, the UPDF collected more than 40,000 small arms.

While owners were consulted about the management of livestock, the "protected kraals" restricted the movement and pasturing of livestock. Together with poor animal health care, an estimated 75% of cattle and 65% of sheep/goats in Karamoja were lost.¹³ Throughout the period of forced disarmament, concerns were expressed by human rights groups that the army used excessive force.¹⁴

From 2010 improved security attracted increased investment: some roads were tarmacked; larger towns were connected to the national grid; and health, education, mobile phone, and water and sanitation services were upgraded.¹⁵ The area received a considerable inflow of international aid; for example, in 2017, international donors committed US\$95 million for development,¹⁶ and 59 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were operational.¹⁷ Livestock numbers were reported to increase, albeit that the wealthiest 30% of the population in Karamoja owned around 70% of the livestock.¹⁸

Investment also included private sector funding in the mining sector—gold, marble, limestone, platinum, and lead, among others. This investment is however also linked

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Iyer and Mosebo, 2017.

⁹ Government of Uganda et al., 2018

¹⁰ Gomez, 2002.

¹¹ Focus group discussions in this review.

¹² The President based himself at Morulinga to engage with elders and kraal leaders and establish an imperative for disarmament.

¹³ Cullis, 2018.

¹⁴ United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2007.

¹⁵ Stites et al., 2017.

¹⁶ KRSU, 2016a.

¹⁷ KRSU, 2016b.

¹⁸ Catley and Ayele, 2021.

to the increased local use of *waragi*—an imported home-made crude liquor or commercial gin—as lorries that transport minerals out of the sub-region also ferry *waragi* in.¹⁹ The result is a dramatic increase in levels of “alcohol abuse,” with the number of outpatient cases increasing from around 300 in 2014 to more than 4,000 in 2018.²⁰

I.1.3 Recent history: re-emergence of conflict plus COVID-19 restrictions

In May 2017, the UPDF announced a phased withdrawal from Karamoja. This triggered alarm as *lonetia* or thieves continued to steal small numbers of livestock,²¹ and elders expressed their concerns that the UPDF withdrawal would witness an increase in livestock thefts, leading to a return of raiding.²² These concerns became the grim reality and played a central role in increasing income poverty rates from 61 to 66% and food poverty from 70 to 75% from 2017–2020.²³ This negative trajectory has continued apace, with Karamoja’s multidimensional poverty headcount reaching 85%. This was not only the highest in Uganda but is significantly higher than the 63% for the rest of Uganda’s northern region. Average multidimensional poverty headcounts in rural Uganda are 50.2%.²⁴ Accelerated progress will need to be made for the sub-region to contribute to Uganda’s Vision 2040 that targets upper-middle income status of US\$9,500 per capita, reducing poverty to 5% of the population, and improving domestic savings to 35%.²⁵

Notably too, the poverty headcount statistics were produced before the impacts of COVID-19 restrictions were fully known. In the case of Karamoja, the Karamoja Resilience Support Unit (KRSU) reported that these restrictions led to substantial impacts on livelihoods, food security, and human health and nutrition, and impeded the activities of development programs.²⁶ The first recommendation of the review report to donors and United Nations (UN) agencies in mid-2020 on COVID-19 impacts was, “Prepare to respond to an area-wide food security crisis in Karamoja,” with a worsening situation predicted from November 2020 onwards.

¹⁹ Eyoku, 2022.

²⁰ Cau et. al., 2018.

²¹ Stites and Marshak, 2016.

²² Arong, 2017.

²³ UBOS, 2018 and 2021.

²⁴ UBOS, 2022b.

²⁵ National Planning Authority, 2013.

²⁶ Arasio et al., 2020.

I.2 HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: SAVING LIVES AND LIVELIHOODS

Since the late 1990s there has been a global shift in the way that humanitarian assistance is conceived and delivered. Traditionally this assistance focused almost exclusively on immediate life-saving support to people affected by disasters, with an emphasis on food, health, water, and shelter. However, in the 1990s there was increasing recognition of the need for humanitarian assistance to protect livelihoods and support economic recovery. This approach was captured in the notion of “saving lives and livelihoods” and included diverse humanitarian responses to protect local agricultural production and related assets and support local markets and service providers. Around the same time, cash transfers became more widely used and are now an established form of assistance during emergencies.

Since the mid 2000s the humanitarian community has reinforced the “saving lives and livelihoods” concept by developing specific global standards that support livelihoods. Of relevance to Karamoja are the Minimum Economic Recovery Standards (MERS) and the Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS), both first published in 2009. Of note, the development of these standards was a collaborative effort involving multiple international NGOs and UN agencies, including some with a long-term presence in Karamoja. Livelihood-based standards such as MERS and LEGS received funding from United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and are widely used in humanitarian crises in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan, as well as in much of West Africa and southern Africa.

Running parallel to the emergence of global humanitarian standards to support livelihoods have been two important changes to disaster response in pastoralist areas of Africa, especially in East Africa. First, large-scale social protection programs in Ethiopia and Kenya have included contingency arrangements for droughts and other disasters. In summary, the contingency mechanism allows cash transfers to be increased and/or used more widely in the

face of disasters. In the Kenya case, the Hunger Safety Net Programme uses “emergency scaling” based on the monitoring of rainfall and vegetation levels to trigger additional cash transfers.²⁷ Second, some development programs in pastoralist areas have included flexible funding or “crisis modifiers” that enable development funds to be diverted to disaster response at the onset of a disaster. In 2016 a review of USAID experiences with crisis modifiers showed that when used properly, these mechanisms can support very effective and timely livelihood-based interventions.²⁸ However, crisis modifiers were not evident in development programs in Karamoja up to mid-2021.²⁹

I.3 REAL-TIME REVIEW OF THE 2022 HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN KARAMOJA

In July 2022 the Ugandan media reported that 900 people had died of hunger or hunger-related diseases in the Karamoja sub-region since February 2022, and that 8 out of 10 households had limited or no food.³⁰ The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) estimated that out of a total population of about 1.4 million people, about 518,000 people from Karamoja’s poorest families faced critical food insecurity, and of these, 428,000 people were experiencing crisis levels of food insecurity (Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) phase 3), and 90,000 were at emergency levels of food insecurity (IPC phase 4). For the first time in three years, all the nine districts of Karamoja were at crisis level or worse according to IPC classification. In late July 2022 the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) reported the number of fatalities in Karamoja due to the “food insecurity crisis” at 2,465.

This situation prompted USAID to support a real-time review of the humanitarian crisis in Karamoja, which aimed to:

1. Produce a timeline of key events and issues that contributed to the crisis;
2. Conduct a rapid review of the early warning system in Karamoja to assess effectiveness;
3. Assess the timing, type, and scale of responses by the Government of Uganda and the aid community and likely impact of these responses;

4. Review the coordination of the humanitarian response in Karamoja, covering Government, UN, donor, and NGO leadership and platforms;
5. Based on the tasks above, make recommendations for strengthening the humanitarian response.

The full scope of work for the review is presented in Annex 1.

²⁷ <https://www.hsnp.or.ke/index.php/our-work/scale-up>.

²⁸ Catley and Charters, 2016.

²⁹ Aklilu et al., 2021.

³⁰ Emwamu, 2022.

REVIEW DESIGN AND METHODS

The review was based on three main activities: a literature review, with special attention to early warning reports; participatory assessments with crisis-affected communities; and key informant interviews (KIIs) in Karamoja and Kampala. In line with typical real-time reviews in humanitarian situations, the review was qualitative, and information from the literature, community assessments, and KIIs was triangulated where possible. The review was undertaken over a three-week period from September 27 to October 21, 2022.

This review draws on the United Nations Office of Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) disaster risk equation³¹ to explore the harmful impacts of hazards on the lives and livelihoods of the people of Karamoja:

$$\text{Disaster Risk} = \frac{\text{Hazard} \times \text{Exposure} \times \text{Vulnerability}}{\text{Capacity}}$$

Disaster risk equation

2.1 PARTICIPATORY ASSESSMENTS

In Karamoja, Moroto, Nabilatuk, and Kaabong Districts were purposively selected, being within the most crisis-affected livelihood zone, the CSLZ. Access to Kotido District was not possible during the assessment due to

insecurity. In the districts, four sub-counties were purposively selected as these were judged to be badly affected by the crisis; in each district between two and four villages were visited (Table 1).

With the support of local researchers and leaders, groups of informants were organized in each village. The review team used focus group discussions (FGDs) and participatory methods, viz., transect walks, historical timelines, proportional piling³² using 100 stones, and scoring/ranking. Drawing on the disaster risk equation above, participatory methods included proportional piling of hazards over time, from late 2019 into September 2022. Informant groups listed the main hazards in their locality and allocated 100 stones across the four years for each hazard listed. The largest number of stones were allocated to the years in which exposure levels resulted in the most negative outcomes (see Figure 1). The method was repeated in each district with one informant group. Proportional piling was then used to understand the perceived “primary drivers” of the crisis (Figure 2).

For specific issues, the review team divided the groups into men, women, and young men, to ensure different voices and perspectives were fully taken into consideration. As noted above, information provided by focus groups was verified through triangulation with key informants.³³

Table 1. Location of villages, Central Sorghum and Livestock Zone

District	Sub-county	Village
Moroto	Loputuk	Kaipetar
		Arecek
Nabilatuk	Lolachat	Lopeduru Adengel
		Nangamit
		Nasinyonoit
		Lopwatagete
Kaabong	Kalapata	Kalonyangiat north
	Loyoro	Toroi central

³¹ UNDRR, 2022.

³² Using stones to assess the relationship between different variables or indicators, with the biggest number of the 100 stones assigned to the most important and the least number to the least important.

³³ Catley et al., 2014.

Each informant group comprised a minimum of five men and five women. In almost all communities, however, more people joined and a total of between 120–130 people participated. At the start of each discussion, a member of the review team outlined the purpose: to collect local experiences of food security trends over the past three to four years. All participants agreed to be part of the discussions and to share their experiences.

2.2 KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

In total, the review team interviewed more than 50 key informants representing a range of national and local government offices, and international and local development partners. Key informants are listed in the itinerary that is presented in Annex 2. Each interview was semi-structured and used a checklist of key questions and issues.

2.3 LIMITATIONS

The main limitations to the review were time and access constraints. As mentioned above, it was not possible to visit Kotido District due to insecurity. With hindsight too, it would have been helpful to have had follow-up interviews with some key informants as it was not always possible to get complete information in a single interview.

3. TIMELINE OF EVENTS AND ISSUES THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE CRISIS

This section introduces the crisis in Karamoja, explores key events and issues that have played important roles in deepening the crisis, and presents information on local coping strategies.

3.1 COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS OF KEY EVENTS, ISSUES, AND OUTCOMES

Hazard exposure over time in the three districts is shown in Figure 1 (hazards are presented in descending scores), and total hazard scores by year are presented in Table 2. The figure and table show the following:

- In all three districts, multiple hazards were identified from 2020 onwards, but with variations in hazard exposure by district and by year;
- COVID-19 restrictions were clearly described from 2020 and were consistently higher in 2020 relative to later years. Multiple references were made to the impacts of market closures while COVID-19 restrictions were in place;
- In all three districts the most important hazard exposure in 2022 (to September) was African armyworm;

- Related to raiding and insecurity, all informant groups spoke of the effectiveness of “cordon and search,” but also the brutality and livestock theft by the army;
- Human, livestock, and crop diseases and pests were ever-present in one form or another.³⁴

When considering the crisis in 2022, an important aspect of the hazard context was that the impacts of different hazards were cumulative for two and a half years. So, for example, although COVID-19 restrictions were not scored as an important hazard in 2022, households have yet to recover fully from the livelihood and food security impacts of COVID-19 restrictions. Any possible recovery in 2022 was undermined by other continuing hazards or new hazards. The longevity of the livelihoods and food security impacts of COVID-19 restrictions were reported in KRSU’s post-COVID assessment in 2021.³⁵ This assessment compared the impacts of a severe drought with COVID-19, and while the severity of impacts was higher during drought, many impacts were more prolonged in the case of COVID-19.

The scoring in Table 2 confirms the widely held view that


Table 2. Hazard exposure scores by year

Year	District	Scores	Total scores
2019	Moroto	17	214
	Nabilatuk	74	
	Kaabong	123	
2020	Moroto	315	869
	Nabilatuk	252	
	Kaabong	302	
2021	Moroto	293	650
	Nabilatuk	155	
	Kaabong	202	
2022	Moroto	175	867
	Nabilatuk	369	
	Kaabong	323	

³⁴ Cattle diseases mentioned were anaplasmosis, East Coast fever, anthrax, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, babesiosis, foot and mouth disease, blackquarter, and lumpy skin disease. Sheep and goat diseases were mange, peste des petits ruminants, contagious caprine pleuropneumonia, sudden death, anaplasmosis, tick problems, and foot rot, among others.

³⁵ Arasio and Ayele, 2022.

Figure I. Hazards exposure 2019 to 2022



3. TIMELINE OF EVENTS AND ISSUES THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE CRISIS

2019 was a relatively “good year” with few hazards, although some communities reported outbreaks of human and livestock diseases. Thereafter hazard exposure increased significantly, including to desert locusts, African armyworm, other sorghum/crop diseases, agricultural drought, livestock diseases, other human diseases, and, in single locations, flood and wild animal damage in gardens. Total hazard severity scores and types of hazards are reflected in the Karimojong’s tradition of naming years (Table 3).

Each year grain traders, including World Food Programme (WFP) in some years, purchase thousands of sacks of sorghum immediately after the harvest. This grain is then transported for sale, or storage and subsequent sale, to other sub-regions in Uganda and to neighboring Kenya and South Sudan. Some of the grain is returned to Karamoja the following lean season, although it is then sold at significantly higher prices. Hence in poor and crisis years, the export of locally grown sorghum is a contributing factor to inflated food prices, and increased household food insecurity and hunger.

While recognizing the multi-hazard nature of the crisis, the review team asked focus groups to score and rank local hazards to identify the primary hazard. For this exercise, women and young men scored and ranked hazards separately to ensure that different views were

collected. The scores are presented in Tables 4, 5, and 6 below. Total scores from the three locations are presented in Figure 2. Raiding and insecurity were scored the highest, followed by agricultural drought, COVID-19, and African armyworm. Wildlife damage and floods scored relatively modestly, but, listed as hazards in only one location each, they were significant locally. Desert locusts and other human diseases scored minimally.

Informants also provided detailed timelines on raiding in their respective communities; examples are presented in Annex 3. Understandably perhaps, much of the reporting was in the form of aggressors’ raids in their communities as opposed to those instigated by their own elders and youth.

Informants also scored lean season hunger severity levels for 2019 to 2022; the responses are presented in Figure 3. As indicated, the lean season hunger severity score for 2021 was highest, with more than half of the total score of 300 stones. This scoring points to the carryover impact of multiple hazards in 2020 - the highest hazard score total of 869 (see Table 2) - into high hunger severity levels the following year. Participants recognized the importance of the humanitarian support in 2022, without which, they made clear, the hunger severity score for 2022 would have been considerably higher. With a very high hazard score of 867 in 2022 (see Table 2), high levels of hunger can be expected in 2023.

Table 3. Karimojong naming of years

Location	Year	Local name	English translation
Moroto	2019	<i>Ekaru a lupid</i>	Year of “bile disease” or anaplasmosis in livestock
	2020	<i>Ekaru a Corona</i>	Year of COVID-19
	2021	<i>Ekaru alalaunia arem</i>	Year of raiding
	2022	<i>Ekaru a ekrut/ekutelek</i>	Year of African armyworm
Nabilatuk	2019	<i>Ekaru a Soroti</i>	Year of sorghum sale to Soroti traders
	2020	<i>Ekaru a emasela Corona</i>	Year of COVID-19 or desert locusts
	2021	<i>Ekaru a kalele</i>	Year of floods
	2022	<i>Ekaru ekutelek or ekaru ebuta</i>	Year of African armyworm or sorghum doesn’t have grain
Kaabong	2019	<i>Ekaru a brucella</i>	Year of brucellosis
	2020	<i>Ekaru a Coronalemase</i>	Year of COVID-19/desert locusts
	2021	<i>Ekaru a alalaunia arem</i>	Year of raiding
	2022	<i>Ekaru a ekutelek</i>	Year of African armyworm

3. TIMELINE OF EVENTS AND ISSUES THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE CRISIS

Table 4. Relative importance of hazards in Moroto District

Hazard	Men	Women	Male youth	Median score
Livestock diseases	4	12	12	12
COVID-19	8	16	16	16
Raiding and insecurity	38	24	22	24
Human diseases	0	4	5	4
Desert locusts	2	8	5	6
Sorghum diseases	14	8	10	10
African armyworm	12	10	18	12
Agricultural drought	22	18	12	18
Floods	-	-	-	
Totals	100	100	100	

Table 5. Relative importance of hazards in Nabilatuk District

Hazard	Men	Women	Male youth	Median score
Livestock diseases	8	4	13	8
COVID-19	11	11	14	11
Raiding and insecurity	23	30	27	27
Human diseases	5	3	5	5
Desert locusts	7	5	4	5
Sorghum diseases	9	10	4	9
African armyworm	5	14	11	11
Agricultural drought	15	8	16	15
Floods	17	15	6	15
Totals	100	100	100	

Table 6. Relative importance of hazards in Kaabong District

Hazard	Men	Women	Male youth	Median score
Livestock diseases	12	10	12	12
COVID-19	14	8	10	10
Raiding and insecurity	23	24	26	24
Human diseases	1	2	5	2
Desert locusts	3	3	0	3
Sorghum diseases	7	7	10	7
African armyworm	7	17	13	13
Agricultural drought	20	11	7	11
Wildlife damage - gardens	13	18	17	17
Totals	100	100	100	

3. TIMELINE OF EVENTS AND ISSUES THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE CRISIS

Figure 2. Primary hazards scores (n = 9 groups).





Figure 3. Hunger scores, 2019 to 2022 (n = 3 groups).



3.2 KEY INFORMANT PERCEPTIONS OF KEY EVENTS, ISSUES, AND OUTCOMES

Discussions with key informants provided additional information that was used to develop a composite crisis

timeline (Figure 4). Key informants also referenced the impact of seasonally fluctuating food prices and fluctuating livestock prices because of market closure due to foot and mouth disease (FMD) and COVID-19. Food and goat price trends are presented in Figures 5 and 6.

Figure 4. Composite crisis timeline generated through key informant interviews. Moroto, per 3 kg tin

Date	Key events and issues	Outcomes
Sep '18	A good sorghum harvest in almost areas of Karamoja	Profits invested in herd rebuilding
Dec '18	Tit-for-tat livestock thefts at Kobebe, Moroto District, where Matheniko, Turkana, and Jie share dry season grazing under the Kobebe Rangeland Management Plan	Sale of raided livestock a departure from customary practice and move to commercial raiding. Other actors enjoy large profits.
May '19	Without sanction, thefts escalate and the Jie raid Turkana livestock as they return to Kenya, following good rains in Kenya. The raided animals sold to traders at reduced prices and transported out of Karamoja	
Sep '19	Presidents of Kenya and Uganda sign Cross-border Sustainable Peace and Development Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).	

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3. TIMELINE OF EVENTS AND ISSUES THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE CRISIS

Continued from previous page

Date	Key events and issues	Outcomes
	—Another good sorghum harvest in almost areas of Karamoja	Increased food security
Nov '19	—FMD quarantine closes livestock markets in Kaabong District.	Sale of livestock restricted
Dec '19	—Turkana - Matheniko revenge raid on Jie. Unlawful killing of LCIII Chair, Rupa sub-county by the army	Collapse of trust in state security organizations
Jan '20	—FMD quarantine closes livestock markets in Moroto District.	
Mar '20	—National COVID-19 restrictions close schools, markets, and public transport, and introduce curfews. Movements are restricted and sorghum planting curtailed by 50%.	Economic and social hardship
Jun '20	—National COVID-19 restrictions eased but schools and other academic institutes and places where people congregate remain closed. Uganda COVID-19 restrictions among the toughest globally	
	—Poor harvest in almost all areas the result of COVID-19 restrictions, agricultural drought, and desert locusts	Hunger fuels raiding and widespread rearming Elders forecast hunger in the 2021 lean season.
Sep '20	—Livestock markets reopen. Increasing evidence of army/trader collusion in sale of raided animals	
Nov '20	—Presidential and State campaigns start for the January '21 elections.	Campaigning deflects attention from raiding.
Jan '21	—Raiding levels increase – Jie raiding in Dodoth, Bokora, Pian, and Pokot and reciprocal raids on Jie.	Collapse of governance
Mar '21	—Poor onset of seasonal rains and insecurity limits land preparation, ploughing, and planting.	Poor crop establishment
Sep '21	—A second poor harvest	Fear of severe hunger in the 2022 lean period
Jan '22	—National COVID-19 restrictions lifted, and schools and other education institutions reopen.	Some economic and social recovery
Feb '22	—Local Defence Units (LDUs) desert rather than integrate into the UPDF. Quickly become involved in raiding	Raiding spirals out of control.
	—Russia – Ukraine conflict triggers food price hikes.	Reduced food intake in poorer households
Apr '22	—Late onset of rains and insecurity significantly reduces the area of sorghum/maize/millet planted.	
	—African armyworm infests many areas and decimates emerging crops.	Reduced crop yields forecast
May '22	—Surveyors and soldiers killed at Lokisilei, Moroto District by Turkana warriors	Increased political traction and calls for a security response
	—Teso elders appeal to the President for improved security.	

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3. TIMELINE OF EVENTS AND ISSUES THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE CRISIS

Continued from previous page

Date	Key events and issues	Outcomes
Jun '22	—Joint Parliamentary Group meetings Karamoja, Teso, Acholi, Lange, and Sebei discuss livestock raids.	Meagre harvest in CSLZ and modest humanitarian response. Severe food insecurity forecast for '23.
	—UPDF launches third major disarmament campaign—“cordon and search,” “protected kraals”—and UPDF excesses reported.	
Sep '22	—Third consecutive poor harvest in many areas of east and central Karamoja. Better yields in the Green Belt	Jie-Karimojong relations continue to deteriorate.
	—High food prices	
	—The Jie community boycotted the Karimojong cultural meeting in Abim, and Jie continue to raid Abim and Kaabong Districts.	

Figure 5. Monthly sorghum prices, 2019 to 2022.





Figure 6. Monthly Ekoroy (medium-size male goat) prices, 2019 to 2022.



The composite timeline refers to multiple events with negative impacts on livelihoods, including poor rains and consecutive poor harvests, livestock thefts, raiding and the collapse in confidence in State security organs, COVID-19 restrictions and associated impacts, inflated food prices (including as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war), African armyworm, and even the unintended impacts of 2021 Presidential elections (Figure 4). Key informants therefore corroborated information generated in the focus groups.

Importantly, discussions with the senior agricultural officer in Nabilatuk District helped explain focus group insistence

on drought impacts on crop yields, when some of the areas visited in the district were green and verdant. Specifically, it was explained that rainfall in the sub-region is shifting from a mono- to a bi-modal pattern, with a mid-season break. Hence crops planted early in the growing season must survive without rain from mid-June through July and increasingly into early August. While the outcome does not always equate with crop failure, yields are routinely affected and are lower. A crop assessment in Nabilatuk District in August 2022 reported yield reductions by 30–35%, 70%, and 100% respectively for different cereal crops in Natirae, Lolachat, and Nabilatuk sub-counties.³⁶

³⁶ Omwany, 2022.

3. TIMELINE OF EVENTS AND ISSUES THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE CRISIS

The food and livestock price trends presented in Figures 5 and 6 confirm both seasonal and annual fluctuations. Typically, within the year prices fall sharply after the August-to-September harvest season and rise steadily from January to the pre-harvest peak in June to July the following year, as household grain stocks become exhausted. As food stocks decline, households become increasingly dependent on purchases. Poorer households typically become dependent on purchases well before more wealthy households. However, Figure 5 confirms atypically high sorghum prices from February to August 2021 and again from February to August 2022, with prices between 25% to 110% above 2019 prices. Such inflationary pressures reduce the purchasing power of all households—but most significantly of poorer households—with associated poorer nutritional and well-being outcomes. Atypically high seasonal sorghum prices therefore became another driver of lean season hunger in 2021 and 2022.

Figure 6 provides further insights into the crisis. Following buoyant goat prices in 2019, prices crashed in 2020 because of an FMD quarantine and the livestock export ban of January 2020 and associated market closures in affected districts. As indicated in Figure 4, markets were closed in Moroto from January to August 2020 and Kaabong from November 2019 to end of August 2020. Quarantine restrictions were not imposed in Nabilatuk District. The livestock market closures in Moroto, Kaabong, and other districts in the lean season in the region undermined a key coping strategy. Livestock sale restrictions were further tightened during the COVID-19 pandemic along with all other markets and inter-district travel. Low livestock prices, atypically high sorghum prices in 2020, and poor terms of trade were therefore other drivers in the crisis.

4. EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS

This section of the report explores the role of early warning systems (EWS) in informing the response to the humanitarian crisis. The section draws on the understanding that a functional EWS collects, analyzes, and disseminates credible information that facilitates timely and appropriate government and partner preparedness, mitigation, emergency, and recovery responses.

4.1 EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS PROVIDERS

The review identified a range of EWS service providers, categorized as follows:

- **Customary**—elders and *ngimurok* or prophets
- **Sub-regional**—District Disaster Management Committees (DDMCs) supported by WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
- **National**—Uganda National Meteorological Agency (UNMA) and Office of the Prime Minister (OPM)
- **International**—Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) and Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) information

4.1.1 Customary early warning systems

Agro-pastoral and pastoral communities throughout the Horn of Africa routinely collect, analyze, and share EWS information, and the Karimojong are no exception. Much of this information collection and analysis is informed by detailed knowledge of seasons and local weather systems, including any variance in clouds, wind direction and speed, and temperature from the seasonal norm. In addition, however, elders and *ngimurok* draw on the behavior of their livestock, birds, and wild animals. These animals in turn respond to changes in weather and climatic conditions. For example, the presence or absence of a particular bird species is said to denote the early or delayed onset of seasonal rains. *Ngimurok* also “read” the entrails of slaughtered livestock for future weather information.

Working together, formal and customary EWS providers can complement the work each does separately by sharing

different insights, including outcomes and impacts at the community level. Customary EWS providers can also use long-standing and extensive dissemination routeways that can support the rapid dissemination of EWS information at the community level.

While it is not possible to verify, elders in each of the focus groups stated clearly that they had forecast severe hunger outcomes in 2020, 2021, and 2022 as they witnessed first-hand the impacts of multiple hazards on their livestock and crops. Importantly too, elders in all the focus groups forecast severe levels of hunger in the 2023 lean season.

4.1.2 Sub-regional early warning systems

From 2012–2018, the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED) produced monthly EWS bulletins for each district in Karamoja financed by the European Union (EU). Following a break, in which few if any EWS bulletins appear to have been produced, the EU resumed its investment in EWS strengthening in the sub-region, as part of a wider co-financed sub-Saharan “knowledge for policy” initiative, with Oxfam.

Funded in Karamoja from 2021–2024, the Pro-Resilience Action (Pro-ACT) project is implemented by WFP and FAO with support from the OPM. At the September 2021 launch, the WFP representative stated, “Providing people with the information and skills to prepare (for shocks) is the most effective way of reducing humanitarian need over time. Zero hunger is possible only if communities have the right tools to manage shocks.”³⁷ The project’s development objectives include:

- *Strengthened national and local stakeholders’ capacity to generate and disseminate accurate, timely, and actionable early warning information;*
- *Improved local and national systems and capacity to effectively prepare for and mitigate the impact of shocks on food security and nutrition based on early warning information;*
- *Communities and households in Karamoja benefit from anticipatory and early actions that contribute to strengthening their resilience to shocks and stresses;*
- *Shock-affected households in Karamoja benefit from early response to food crises.*³⁸

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ UN OCHA, 2021.

4. EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS

Pro-ACT deployed EWS advisors to each of the nine districts in Karamoja, in the offices of Chief Administrative Officers (CAO), and the project's first district bulletins for July and August 2021 preceded the official launch. Excerpts from these first bulletins—for the districts visited—included:

- *Nabilatuk District Drought Bulletin*, July 2021: normal to dry conditions, African armyworm infestation, destructive flash floods, empty granaries, increased incidence of livestock diseases, falling labor, and increased food prices. The Bulletin recommended that contingency funds be activated for Lolachat and Lorengedwat sub-counties.³⁹

More nuanced, the Moroto District Drought Bulletin referred to the impact of a break in the rains in June 2021, which was recorded as the year's driest month—at the time of the Bulletin's release—and associated impacts on seasonal crop growth, as was also the case in Nabilatuk. The Bulletin also highlighted the continuing damaging effects of the COVID-19 pandemic impacts.⁴⁰

In December 2021, Pro-ACT Bulletins provided additional useful EWS analysis that included the following:

- *Kaabong District Drought Bulletin*: overall, the district is at ALARM stage. This is attributed to limited availability of pasture and water for livestock, poor harvest, poor return on the sale of labor coupled with high food prices, and both crop and livestock diseases. The drought bulletin recommended the activation of contingency plans and increased support to address livestock diseases.⁴¹
- *Nabilatuk District Drought Bulletin*: overall, the district is classified in the WATCH stage or dry conditions, but normal for the time of the year. There is, however, some concern as water availability, food prices, labor wages, and terms of trade are all outside normal ranges. Pasture is also depleted, and livestock have been trekked to grazing areas bordering Teso and Bugisu. Overall, most households (HHs) are stressed and struggling to meet basic needs (food items). The drought bulletin recommended the activation of the contingency plan to support household income and increase purchasing power so that they could afford to buy food in the markets.⁴²

³⁹ WFP and FAO, 2021a.

⁴⁰ WFP and FAO, 2021b.

⁴¹ WFP and FAO, 2021c

⁴² WFP and FAO, 2021d.

⁴³ FAO and WFP, 2022.

⁴⁴ Anon., 2022

In August 2022, Pro-ACT held a meeting with district local government leaders to explore multi-hazard EWS and early action systems strengthening, after which Pro-ACT disseminated a Consolidated Karamoja Drought Bulletin for August 2022 that included the following:

- *Moroto, Kotido, and Nakapiripirit*: a general improvement in drought impacts across all districts, with Moroto, Kotido, and Nakapiripirit moving from the ALARM phase to the WATCH phase. Improvements due to the green harvest and distribution of food relief/ cash transfers;
- *Rainfall July–August*: continued below average but increased pasture growth for livestock and replenishment of water sources for human and livestock populations;
- *Kaabong, Abim, and Amudat*: remain with high food gaps, high food prices, crop failure, and animal diseases and in the ALARM phase. In Kaabong, large areas of cropland destroyed by wild animals from Kidepo National Park.

The Consolidated Bulletin concluded with the following recommendations:

- *Contingency plan activation*: “It is necessary to respond to the impact of last year's poor harvest, which has continued to manifest itself in the form of very low household food stocks. Contingency plans should be activated because the livestock sector continues to be affected by parasites and tick-borne diseases, coupled with raids and livestock theft. Additionally, the increasing rates of acute malnutrition reported in all the districts need to be paid attention to.”

“Finally, while the activation of district contingency plans for the sub-region is necessary to respond to the short-term emergency, more emphasis needs to be placed on medium to long-term preparedness and resilience programmes for communities in Karamoja.”⁴³

The review team could find no definitive link between Pro-ACT EWS bulletins and the humanitarian response. However, it is likely that these bulletins helped amplify concerns raised about levels of hunger and starvation by Members of Parliament (MPs) for Karamoja in July 2022,⁴⁴ and helped kick-start a more focused humanitarian response.

4.1.3 National

The UNMA produces quarterly seasonal forecasts following Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Climate Prediction and Application Centre (IPAC)-supported Greater Horn of Africa Climate Outlook Forum (GHACOF) meetings. These GHACOF meetings produce quarterly seasonal forecasts based on an analysis of customized global climate model predictions for the region. For example, the Seasonal Rainfall Outlook for June–August 2020 over Uganda reported the following for the northeastern region of Amuria, Katakwi, Nabilatuk, Karenga, Moroto, Kotido, Nakapiripirit, Abim, Napak, Amudat, and Kaabong:

- *Northeastern region*: currently experiencing some rain with a forecast reduction from mid-June up to late July when isolated showers are expected to the end of the season. Overall, near normal, with a tendency to above-normal rainfall conditions expected over most parts of the region for the forecast period.⁴⁵

As confirmed in the scoring of hazards in Figure 1, this seasonal forecast accurately forecast a break in the rains or agricultural drought and subsequent impacts on crop yields in Lolachat sub-county.

The March–May 2021 Seasonal Rainfall Outlook included the following forecast:

- *Northeastern region*: since January 2021 the region has experienced dry conditions. The onset of seasonal rains is expected to start late March–early April, with a peak early to mid-May. Thereafter a moderate relaxation is expected around early to mid-June. Overall, there is high chance for this region to receive near normal, with slight tendency to above-normal rains.⁴⁶

This seasonal forecast was followed by a mid-seasonal forecast of June–August 2021, which included:

- *Northeastern region*: the region has experienced occasional rains that are expected to continue to late June 2021 when steady rains are expected to set in, to the end of forecast period. Overall, near normal with a tendency to above-normal rainfall is expected.

In these two Outlooks, the UNMA again forecast delayed and erratic seasonal rains in 2021. Again, this forecast is accurately reflected in community-level analysis and scoring of hazards in Figure 1, with high scores for “agricultural drought” in 2021 in Moroto and Kaabong Districts. In contrast, focus groups in Lolachat sub-county reported damage to gardens by flash floods in the same period.

In December 2022, the Forum will again meet to provide a forecast for the first quarter of 2023. This forecast will provide a useful guide to the onset of Karamoja’s single rainy season.

4.1.4 International

A timeline of the EWS information produced by FEWS NET and IPC is presented in Table 7, and the IPC classification scale is presented in Figure 7.

As indicated in the Table 7, FEWS NET and IPC reports for Karamoja provided clear evidence of high levels of exposure to multiple hazards in Karamoja’s primary livelihood sub-sectors as presented in the summary here:

- **Crops**: erratic and poor rainfall or agricultural drought, floods, locusts, African armyworm, other crop diseases, COVID-19 and restrictions on movements and markets, high food prices;
- **Livestock**: cattle raiding, livestock disease including FMD and the associated quarantine restrictions and closure of livestock markets, COVID-19 restrictions and loss of markets, and impacts of disarmament.

Table 7. FEWS NET and IPC early warning systems information

Date	Information disseminated
Oct '19 FEWS NET ⁴⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Harvests improve food availability and firewood/charcoal-to-sorghum terms of trade. In southern and central areas, improved to IPC 2. In Kaabong, where harvest is later, reliance on market purchases and below-average incomes are sustaining IPC 3 until harvest improves to IPC 2 in November.

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⁴⁵ UNMA, 2020.

⁴⁶ UNMA, 2021.

⁴⁷ FEWS NET, 2019a.

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Date	Information disseminated
Dec '19 FEWS NET⁴⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Food security conditions improving, though IPC Phase 2 outcomes widespread. Availability of labor opportunities and favorable firewood-to-sorghum and charcoal-to-sorghum terms of trade supporting market purchases. Stressed outcomes expected to May 2020, though increasing numbers of poor households to face worse outcomes from start of the lean season in March
Jun '20 FEWS NET⁴⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Poor households experiencing limited food, but available in markets. COVID-19 restrictions allow cargo movement, but closure of livestock markets, restaurants, schools, and social gatherings has affected income. Limited livestock sales permissible where there are FMD quarantine and low prices: Kotido, Moroto, Nakapiripirit, Napak, and Abim. Livestock raids. Poor with food gaps—IPC 3 Main harvest in September expected to be delayed and below average due to delayed planting, below-normal area planted, poor access to seeds, erratic rainfall distribution, and waterlogging
Jun '20 IPC⁵⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acute malnutrition analysis: Moroto = IPC 4, Napak = IPC 3, and other districts = IPC 2
Aug '20 FEWS NET⁵¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acute food insecurity in Uganda continues to be driven by the economic impacts of COVID-19 on household income sources and the impact of erratic rainfall and floods on crop production.
Dec '20 FEWS NET⁵²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IPC 2 prevalent due to the availability of own-produced crops and the reopening of livestock markets, which support improved income and purchasing power. However, after own crops consumed, household income expected to be insufficient for many to meet their food needs. IPC Phase 3 outcomes are likely during the February-May projection period.
Mar '21 IPC⁵³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 30% of analyzed population in six districts or 361,000 people experiencing IPC 3 or above (March–July '21: Kotido - 94,900 (45%), Kaabong - 51,500, Napak - 56,300, and Moroto - 42,400). Drivers: insecurity, impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and high food prices. During August 2021–January 2022, three districts anticipated IPC 3, and six districts anticipated in IPC Phase 2.
Jun '21 FEWS NET⁵⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IPC 2–IPC 3 expected to September with poorest being IPC 4 in Kaabong and Moroto Districts due to limited income sources. Food insecurity driven by delayed and significantly below-average harvest, COVID-19 restrictions, and livestock loss through raids. Although the harvest October/November will improve food security, Crisis 3 outcomes will persist where crop harvests poor.
Dec '21 FEWS NET⁵⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Very dry conditions, livestock productivity declines, food prices, and poor harvests drive reduced food availability. Crisis IPC 3 to May 2022 widespread. Sorghum prices above average. Limited stocks, recovery in net exports, and anticipated reopened economy in January drove high staple prices. Scarce food supply impacting on imports. Sale of firewood, charcoal, and goats all purchase less sorghum currently than five-year average, driving lower food access for poor households.

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⁴⁸ FEWS NET, 2019b.

⁴⁹ FEWS NET, 2020a.

⁵⁰ IPC, 2020.

⁵¹ FEWS NET, 2020b.

⁵² FEWS NET, 2020c.

⁵³ IPC, 2021.

⁵⁴ FEWS NET, 2021a.

⁵⁵ FEWS NET, 2021b.

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Date	Information disseminated
Apr '22 IPC ⁵⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All districts IPC 3 with 40% of population (518,000 people) IPC 3 or above March–July 2022. Highest in Kaabong, Kotido, and Moroto with 50% IPC 3 or above, followed by Nabilatuk at 40%. Continued deteriorating food security: IPC 3 or above 27% in June '20, 30% in April '21, and 41% in April '22 50% households depleted essential livelihood assets and are consuming seed stocks to cope. Anticipated situation will slightly improve August 2022–February 2023 with reduction of IPC 3 or above from 518,000 (41%) to 315,000 (25%). 38,000 people (3% of population analyzed) in IPC 4
Jun '22 FEWS NET ⁵⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Insecurity constraining typical livelihood activities, and food prices are well above average. Harvest in September will improve food security, but crop production likely will be below normal, and IPC 3 outcomes expected to January due to below-average purchasing power. Some of poorest likely in IPC 4. Poor food consumption has contributed to increased acute malnutrition in Moroto and Kaabong Districts.
Sep '22 FEWS NET ⁵⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Slight improvement in food availability from meagre harvest and humanitarian food assistance. Many poor not benefiting, as crop production poor and humanitarian programs inadequate relative to need. Ongoing insecurity constrains income-earning and marketing/trading activities. Increased prices for charcoal and firewood in combination with sorghum price declines in some markets have improved terms of trade and food access for poor. However, sorghum prices remain 62–100% higher than prices recorded at same time last year and are expected to increase further. Overall, many poor face consumption gaps, with IPC 3 outcomes expected to persist through to January.

International EWS providers therefore provided detailed and clear evidence of deteriorating food and nutrition outcomes from a majority IPC 2 in December 2019 to widespread IPC 3–IPC 4 in May 2022. Any lingering doubt about the seriousness of the unfolding humanitarian crisis in Karamoja should have been dispelled by UN OCHA's July 2022 report of 2,465 fatalities, mainly children and elders, the result of the crisis.⁵⁹ As outlined in the Introduction (section 1), these fatalities are likely to be the result of the combination of multiple hazards and multidimensional poverty.

⁵⁶ IPC, 2022.

⁵⁷ FEWS NET, 2022a.

⁵⁸ FEWS NET, 2022b.

⁵⁹ UN OCHA, 2022.

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Figure 7. IPC v3.1 Acute Food Insecurity Phases.

Phase	Description	Indicators
Phase 1	Minimal	Households can meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.
Phase 2	Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.
Phase 3	Crisis	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition, OR - Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.
Phase 4	Emergency	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Have large food consumption gaps, which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality, OR - Can mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.
Phase 5	Famine	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution, and critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. For Famine Classification, an area needs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - > 25% households meet > 25% calorific requirements from humanitarian food aid; - > 25% households meet > 50% calorific requirement from humanitarian food aid.

5. LOCAL COPING STRATEGIES AND THE WIDER HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

This section of the report presents information on local coping strategies and humanitarian dashboards for the timing, type, and duration of the response for Moroto, Nabilatuk, and Kaabong Districts. In addition, information is presented on the links between development and resilience projects and the humanitarian response, including the use of crisis modifiers.

5.1 COPING STRATEGIES

Table 8 confirms the importance of coping strategies in the IPC classification (Figure 7), with IPC 4 “Emergency” phase defined in part by: “households can mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.”

Focus groups provided information on coping strategies, including that in “normal” years, households sell grain and livestock to generate income for expenditure on health care, school fees, livestock medicines, salt, soap, and other essential household items. In contrast, in “crisis” years such as 2020, 2021, and 2022, when grain stocks are limited and households have few livestock, different coping strategies are employed. For example, informants told of eating fewer and smaller meals, of available food being prioritized for children, and of routinely eating poorer-quality meals. Some also said that the elderly were often left with little or no food in times of severe hunger.

Informants also provided a list of “lean” and “crisis” season income-generating activities in Table 8, activities that are used to plug household income gaps and support the purchase of food. The lists are disaggregated by gender. The informants went on to say that insecurity in 2020, 2021, and 2022 had made it more difficult to engage in some of these activities, as it was not safe to travel far from the homesteads. This reduced mobility compromised income from: making charcoal; collecting firewood, poles, grass, wild fruit, and gathering leaves; hunting; and even, in some cases, carrying water. Insecurity also reduced casual employment opportunities, especially in garden-related work in more remote fields, where plough oxen might be stolen and women abused, with the result that the area of land cultivated was much reduced. Informants explained that instead they invested time in breaking stones for construction (aggregate), vegetable production around boreholes, brickmaking, brewing, and mining.

At a strategic level, collecting firewood, wood for roofing poles, and grass, and making charcoal have medium- and long-term environmental impacts. In one of Uganda’s more fragile agro-ecologies, the unregulated use of natural resources for plugging income gaps can have far-reaching outcomes on sustainable livelihoods and associated well-being of future generations.

Table 8. Income-generation activities by gender

Activity	Moroto		Nabilatuk		Kaabong	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Charcoal burning and sale	=	=	=	=	=	=
Sale of firewood		+		+		
Sale of poles for construction	=	=				+
Sale of grass				+		+
Gathering wild fruits/vegetables		+		+		+
Sale of aggregate		+	O			+
Sale of murrum (soil used for road surface)	O					
Collecting tree leaves - <i>ekorete</i>			O			
Gifts/loans of livestock	O					
Fishing in swamps			O			
Vegetable production at boreholes						+
Hunting wildlife	O				O	

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Activity	Moroto		Nabilatuk		Kaabong	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Harvesting aloe vera						+
Carrying water						O
Brickmaking					O	
Casual labor (various - construction/ gardens, etc.) in and out of Karamoja	=	=	=	=	=	=
Brewing - production/sale		+				+
Mining gold					O	
Sale of poultry				+		
Loans - Village Savings and Loan Association (VSLA)				+		
<i>Boda-boda</i> (motorbike taxis)			O			
Bicycle repair			O			
Begging				O		

Key: = denotes a shared gender role; + denotes a predominately women's role; and O denotes a mainly men's role

5.2 HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

In FGDs, informants provided detailed information on the humanitarian assistance that they had received in 2022 (Table 9). In addition, Chief Administrative Officers and their representatives in Moroto, Nabilatuk, and Kaabong also shared the latest humanitarian dashboards, while recognizing the information would need to be updated to the end of October 2022. The dashboard for Moroto District is presented in Table 10, and dashboards for Nabilatuk and Kaabong Districts in Annex 4.

Focus groups also recognized the recent progress being made to reduce livestock raids and cited the following reasons for improvement:

- *Forceful disarmament* – “cordon search” and the collection of small arms;
- *Capture and imprisonment* - of some of the tenacious raiders including former LDUs/vigilantes who had deserted rather than being amalgamated into the UPDF;

- *Livestock transfer* - 16 local and improved goats or, in some cases, Uganda shillings (Ushs) 700,000 to raiders who voluntarily hand in semiautomatic weapons to the authorities.⁶⁰

Significantly, all focus groups agreed that the delivery of humanitarian assistance had little or no effect on conflict mitigation.

Tables 9 and 10 make clear that humanitarian assistance was well targeted to vulnerable groups: under-5s, pregnant and breast-feeding mothers, and the elderly. In total, some 7,000 households received some assistance through distributions that reached all sub-counties. An additional 5,500 households received assistance through targeted distributions to specific sub-counties. With a degree of overlap inevitable, an estimated 11,000 households received some form of assistance in the period May to August 2022, and perhaps 1,500 households received assistance in two months. With an average of six people per household,⁶¹ the total number of people reached was an estimated 66,000 or approximately 53% of the total population of 123,800 for between one to two months.⁶²

⁶⁰ Valued by participants in some focus groups, other participants and several key informants expressed surprise at the costs of the livestock transfers initiative and went on to suggest that use could be made of the Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS) approach to identify more cost-effective interventions, including the use of vouchers.

⁶¹ UBOS, 2018.

⁶² UBOS, 2022a.

Table 9. Focus groups—humanitarian response timelines

Month	Moroto District	Nabilatuk District	Kaabong District
Jan–Oct '22	<i>Andre Foods International (AFI)/WFP</i> – malnourished children, pregnant/breast-feeding women: Plumpy’Nut. Health center support for children identified by village health teams (VHTs) and anthropometric measurements	<i>AFI/WFP</i> – malnourished children, pregnant/breast-feeding women: Plumpy’Nut, soya flour mixed with oil, sugar – malnourished children and pregnant/breast-feeding women *Routine moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) nutrition support – 2017ff	<i>AFI/WFP</i> – malnourished children, pregnant/breast-feeding women: Plumpy’Nut and 4 kg soya flour/month *Routine MAM nutrition support – 2017ff
April '22	None	None	<i>OPM</i> distribution to the elderly: Posho – 2.5 kg and beans – 0.5 kg
May '22	None	None	<i>Mana Sudan</i> – disabled, elderly, orphans, and widows: cooking oil – 1 liter, silver fish – 1 kg, soap – 1 kg, salt – 500 g, eggs – 2
Jun '22	<i>OPM</i> ⁶³ – through sub–county distributed the following only to elderly people (3 per village): 6 kg flour, 3 kg beans per person	<i>OPM</i> through sub–county Maize flour/household – 12 kg, beans – 6 kg	None
July '22	<i>Mercy Corps</i> – pregnant and breast-feeding women: Cash vouchers – Ushs 100,000/ from selected vendors: 10 kg flour, 1 liter cooking oil, 500 g salt, 1 kg beans, 1 onion, 500 g silver fish	<i>OPM</i> through Lolachat sub–county: Maize flour/household – 6 kg, beans – 3 kg	<i>OPM</i> distribution to households: Posho (maize meal) – 2.5 kg, beans 0.5 kg
Aug '22	<i>Mercy Corps</i> – 2nd cash voucher <i>OPM</i> – through sub–county distributed to elderly: 6 kg flour, 3 kg beans per person <i>AFI/WFP</i> – families with malnourished children – 30 kg maize, 2.5 liters cooking oil, cash of Ushs 30,000/– (beans and salt)	<i>AFI/WFP</i> – blanket feeding for all pregnant and breast-feeding women: maize – 27 kg, cooking oil – 3 liters, Ushs 30,000/ for purchase of silver fish, onions, tomatoes, beans, salt, vegetables	None
Sep '22	None	<i>WFP/AFI</i> – as above but rice replaced maize. Focus group appreciate distribution as Plumpy’Nut distributions resulted in theft including by men in the community.	None

⁶³ On July 12, 2022, the Prime Minister informed a sitting of Parliament that the Government had allocated Ushs 135 billion for food for Karamoja for three months. This amount was later disbursed across a number of sub-regions affected by disaster.

5. LOCAL COPING STRATEGIES AND THE WIDER HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

Table 10. Moroto District—humanitarian response dashboard

Implementing partner	Location	Type of beneficiary					Number of Beneficiaries	Duration	Type of response
		Under 5	Age 5+	Lactating	Pregnant	Elderly			
Office of the Prime Minister	All sub-counties	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	16,350 beneficiaries	May–Jun	320 mt maize and 160 mt beans
AIRTEL	Loputuk,	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	700 households (HHs)	1 month	20 kg of posho, 10 kg of beans/HH
Bugiri community	Lotisan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	15 HHs	1 month	20 kg of posho, 10 kg of beans/HH
CLIDE	Rupa, Katiekile, Nadunget, Loputuk	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	700 HHs	3 months	10 kg of posho/HH
Church of Uganda	All sub-counties	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	800 HHs	1 month	800 bags of posho
Cooperation and Development	All sub-counties	Yes					200 HHs	2 months	Rice, sugar, pasta, vegetable oil
Direct Aid	Lotisan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	1,000 HHs	1 month	10 kg of posho, 5 kg of beans, 5 kg of sugar and cooking oil/HH
Enlighten Church	Rupa	Yes	Yes	Yes	yes	Yes	100 HHs	1 month	20 kg of posho, 10 kg of beans/HH
FAO/World Vision	Tapac and Rupa	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	1,000 HHs	3 months	20 kg of posho, 10 kg of beans/HH
KIDEP	All sub-counties	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	3,112 HHs	2 months	15–20 kg of posho, 7–15 kg of beans/HH
Light for the World	Lotisan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	500 HHs	1 month	20 kg of posho, 10 kg of beans/HH
Mercy Corps	Nadunget, Loputuk	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		199 HHs	Jul–Aug	Ushs 100 k voucher for 30% HH food needs
Saudi Arabia community	All sub-counties	Yes					1,552 HHs	1 month	69 boxes of dates

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Implementing partner	Location	Type of beneficiary					Number of Beneficiaries	Duration	Type of response
		Under 5	Age 5+	Lactating	Pregnant	Elderly			
Save the Mothers	Rupa				Yes	Yes	50 mothers	1 month	20 kg of posho, 10 kg of beans/HH
Soroti community	Lotisan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	50 HHs	1 month	20 kg of posho, 10 kg of beans/HH
Tororo Cement	Tapac	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	All HHs - Tapac sub-county		10 kg of posho, 1 kg beans
URA	Rupa	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	700 HHs		
Welthungerhilfe	All sub-counties	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	1,035 HHs	1 month	20 kg of posho, 10 kg of beans/HH

Implementing various multi-year health, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), nutrition, school feeding, and market support programs, WFP and UNICEF secured emergency funding to implement “surge” programs. Details of WFP and UNICEF routine and surge programs are presented in Table 11. As the surge response gathered momentum and mass screening expanded, the scale of the crisis in Karamoja has become clearer. For example, the result of expanded mass screening, UNICEF reported an increase in severe acute malnutrition (SAM) admissions from 1,700 to 4,100 from January to August 2022, an increase of more than 140%.⁶⁴

5.3 APPROPRIATENESS AND LIKELY IMPACT OF THE CRISIS RESPONSE

To assess the appropriateness and hence the likely impact of the crisis response, reference is made to district local government multi-hazard contingency plans. For example, summary risk assessment analysis and sector contingency plans for Moroto District are presented in Table 12 and 13.⁶⁵ As can be seen, there are strong parallels between the hazards in Table 12 and those identified by the community groups, e.g., agricultural drought, raiding and insecurity, and crop, human, and livestock diseases.

Table 11. Nutrition support programs

Agency	Routine nutrition support programs	Surge nutrition response programs
UNICEF Uganda	- Routine treatment of severely acute malnourished children/mothers	- A mass screening of 249,859 children aged 6–59 months found 3.2% severely and 13.9% moderately malnourished. ⁶⁶ - Expanded treatment for severely acute malnourished children/mothers
World Food Programme	- 2017ff: Community Based Supplementary Feeding Programme for moderate acute malnourished children - Home-Grown School Feeding Programme	- A three-month protection ration for 140,000 households with a malnourished child in worst-affected areas of Nabilatuk, Napak, Moroto, Kotido, and Kaabong and a three-month blanket supplementary feeding to children under 2 in Nabilatuk, Kotido, and Kaabong. ⁶⁷

⁶⁴ UNICEF, 2022a.

⁶⁵ Moroto District Local Government, 2021.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Financed by the European Union, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States.

5. LOCAL COPING STRATEGIES AND THE WIDER HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

Table 12. Moroto District—risk assessment analysis

Hazard	Likelihood	Severity of impact	Relative risk	Vulnerable sub-counties
	Relative likelihood this will occur*	Overall impact (average)**	Probability x impact severity***	
Drought	5	5	21–25	Nadunget, Rupa, Katikekile, Tapac
Livestock raiding	5	5	21–25	
Livestock disease	5	4	21–25	
Crop pests and diseases	4	4	11–20	
Human epidemics	4	4	11–20	

* Likelihood scale: 1 = Not occur; 2 = Doubtful; 3 = Possible; 4 = Probable; 5 = Inevitable

** Severity of impact scale: 1 = Very low; 2 = Low; 3 = Moderate; 4 = High; 5 = Very high

*** Relative risk scale: 1–10 = Low; 11–20 = Moderate; 21–25 = High

Key

	High
	Moderate
	Low

Table 13. Moroto District sector contingency response plans for community-level identified hazards

Hazard	Security agencies	Production departments	Community development	Administration
Livestock raiding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recovery of stolen livestock • Peace talks and sensitization • Stringent laws to dissuade 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Restocking • Provision of water • Electronic branding 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Psychosocial support • Dialogue and mindset change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mobilization of resources • Planning and budgeting • Coordination and review meetings
	Natural resource department	Production departments	Community development	Trade and industry department
Agricultural drought	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EWS response plans • Protection of water sources • Capacity building 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Drought-resistant crops • Solar small-scale irrigation • Income-generating activities (IGAs)—combat negative coping strategies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community sensitization • Stocking nutrition supplies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Link farmers to markets • Farming training—IGA • Cereal banking and marketing groups

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Hazard	Security agencies	Production departments	Community development	Administration
	Enforcement agencies	Production departments		
Livestock diseases	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Case follow-ups • Policy implementation • Community monitoring 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vaccination and treatment—spraying and deworming • Stock up the veterinary supplies • Quarantine to reduce spread of disease • Disease surveillance and livestock information systems 		
		Production departments	Community development	OPM and CAO's office
Crop pests and diseases		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical support—early maturing vegetables • Alternative livelihoods 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information dissemination • Mindset change • Mobilization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activate emergency plan • Provision of relief food • Coordination, budgeting, and monitoring and reporting
	Health department		Community development	Water department
Human diseases	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activate health response teams, plans, and coordination • Stock up the medical supplies • Establish isolation units • Train community health workers 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community mobilization • Psychosocial support • Referrals and linkages • Coordination of community structures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Infectious prevention and control (IPC) support • Test/treatment of water source • Gazette water sources • Strengthen water committees

The publication of the Moroto District Local Government's Multi-hazard Contingency Plan in 2020 coincided with the first of the now-three crisis years. While several interventions outlined in the Contingency Plan have utility, disarmament and humanitarian assistance were not operationalized in the sub-region until 2022. There is therefore a time-lag of some 18 months in which the deepening humanitarian crisis continued to be communicated in EWS bulletins, without response.

The reasons for this delay are several and diverse and include a global reduction in humanitarian assistance and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the global economy; Uganda's economy was similarly impacted. The

humanitarian crisis in Karamoja also coincided with the more widely publicized Horn of Africa drought crisis in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia because of consecutive La Niña years that are driving the most unprecedented levels of hunger in 40 years in the region.⁶⁸ Finally, the Russia-Ukraine war has impacted global commodity prices and resulted in increases in food and fuel prices, and hence similar increases in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. These events however do not fully explain the delayed declaration of a multi-hazard emergency in Karamoja that would have supplemented local government budgets and supported humanitarian crisis appeals.

⁶⁸ UNICEF, 2022b.

Surprisingly, some key informants questioned the validity of EWS information, such as levels of acute malnutrition, and implied that these reports were exaggerated. In some cases, senior development program managers seemed not to understand the severity of the crisis in Karamoja or how they might respond to it. It was unclear whether these attitudes contributed to an overall humanitarian response that focused on human nutrition and health and that, contrary to global humanitarian standards, overlooked livelihoods-based interventions.

Lessons learned in the pastoral areas of the Horn of Africa also suggest that more could have been done to mitigate some of the most serious impacts of crisis years had international development partners made routine use of crisis modifiers. When implemented effectively, crisis modifiers facilitate strategic early, and cost-effective, livelihoods-based interventions in the pre-emergency phase and hence are independent of crisis declarations. At the same time, development programs can continue to invest in the delivery of routine development interventions that address the causes of multidimensional poverty. Despite the documentation of positive lessons and emerging good practice,⁶⁹ it appears the use of crisis modifiers is not mainstreamed in Karamoja.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Peters and Pinchon, 2017.

⁷⁰ Also see Catley and Charters (2016) for USAID-funded crisis modifier experiences in East Africa, and Aklilu et al. (2021) for more details of development programs in Karamoja that lack crisis modifiers.

6. HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION

This section of the review report presents information on humanitarian coordination structures in government, UN, donor, and NGO leadership and platforms and the extent to which coordination was effective and supported a timely, coherent, and appropriate response to the crisis. This section also assesses if and how responses supported livelihoods and harmonized with ongoing development and resilience programs.

6.1 COORDINATION STRUCTURES

Coordination structures that play a role in responding to the humanitarian crisis in Karamoja include:

- **Ministry for Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees (MRDPR).** Located in the OPM, the MRDPR is responsible for the delivery of the 2011 National Policy on Disaster Preparedness and Management (NPDPM) and coordination of all disaster risk management and response operations in Uganda. The NPDPM authorizes the President to declare a national emergency for a crisis that affects the lives or livelihoods of 50,000 Ugandans or more. The policy defines the roles and responsibilities of the Cabinet, Ministerial Policy Committee, Inter-agency Technical Committee, and National Emergency Coordination and Operations Centre (NECOC).

Established within the OPM in 2014, NECOC is responsible for the coordination of declared emergencies at regional, sub-regional, district, sub-county, and on down to the village level. NECOC is also responsible for coordinating and harmonizing EWS information on disasters, climate modelling, and forecasting. NECOC has played a support role to the MRDPR in the humanitarian response to the crisis in Karamoja.

The MDRPR recently drafted a legal framework that will be presented to Parliament for enactment. It is anticipated that the legal framework will address the lack of designated contingency funding that is widely recognized as a key weakness in disaster risk management in Uganda.⁷¹ The act would require that disaster risk management, crisis modifiers, and contingency funds be mainstreamed at all levels of Government programming.
- **Ministry for Karamoja Affairs (MfKA).** Also located in the OPM, the MfKA is responsible for the coordination of Government ministries and NGOs operating in the Karamoja sub-region. The Ministry is currently finalizing the Karamoja Integrated Development Plan III (KIDP III). The MfKA has assisted the MRDPR's delivery of humanitarian assistance in Karamoja.
- **Karamoja Parliamentary Group (KPG).** A forum for the 26 MPs from the Karamoja sub-region, the Group meets periodically to discuss issues and events in the sub-region. In June 2022 the Group carried out a reconnaissance visit to all nine districts in response to media reports of increasing hunger-related human deaths.⁷² The report has not been released as of the end of October 2022.
- **Karamoja Development Partners Group (KDPG).** KDPG is a monthly meeting of bi- and multi-lateral organizations working in Karamoja and a representative of the NGOs in the Karamoja NGO Group (NiKG). The KDPG appoints an annual chair and co-chair, and these positions are currently held by USAID and FAO. KRSU provides secretarial support.
- **UN Humanitarian Coordination Team (HCT).** Led by the Humanitarian Coordinator, the HCT's primary responsibility is to ensure humanitarian action protects the lives, livelihoods, and dignity of people in need.⁷³ As the most senior UN inter-agency humanitarian body in-country, the HCT is responsible for providing the necessary strategic direction for the UN's inter-agency humanitarian response. It also aims to ensure that all humanitarian action is coordinated, principled, timely, effective, and efficient. It aims to ensure that adequate prevention, preparedness, risk, and security management measures are in place and functioning. While the HCT operates in support of and coordinates with national and local authorities that are responsible for the organization, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance, the HCT is ultimately accountable to the people in need.

UNICEF reports that the HCT and Humanitarian Inter-Agency Coordination Group (HICG) bring UN

⁷¹ For example, see Aklilu et al. 2021.

⁷² Key informant interview, Number 1.

⁷³ IASC, 2017.

and NGO heads and technical leads together monthly to ensure common strategies and targets for the Karamoja crisis.⁷⁴ That said, except for UNICEF there is no evidence of a UN Karamoja Response Plan and no reference to the crisis in Karamoja sub-region in the UN Uganda Bulletin of July–August 2022.⁷⁵

- ***Karamoja Nutrition and Health Partners Coordination (KNHPC) meeting.*** At sub-regional level, UNICEF is secretariat of this in-person and virtual monthly meeting. In response to the deepening humanitarian crisis, the meeting now meets weekly. The meeting welcomes nutrition and health actors working in the sub-region, including UN agencies, development partners, NGOs and other implementing partners, district local governments, and Moroto Regional Referral Hospital (RRH). The primary purpose of the meeting is to coordinate and strengthen nutrition and health programming in the sub-region.⁷⁶

In the meeting on October 4, 2022, for example, key issues addressed included low stocking levels of ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF) in Kotido, Moroto, and Napak, an outbreak of cholera in Kotido District, and the number of deaths in the nutrition unit of Moroto Regional Referral Hospital. In October 2022 UNICEF deployed an Emergency Coordinator to Karamoja to support the surge response. The Emergency Coordinator will work closely with the KNHPC meeting.

- ***District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC).*** At district level, the CAO chairs the DDMC that comprises district departmental heads, the Uganda Red Cross Society, and international and local NGOs active in the district. The DDMC is responsible for all planning, implementation, monitoring, and reporting of disaster risk management at the district level. With the support of IGAD’s Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) and technical support from WFP, each district has developed a multi-hazard contingency plan (e.g., see Table 13). These plans commit districts to the development of efficient and effective district-level disaster risk management systems that support well-coordinated multi-sectoral approaches to prevent, mitigate, and respond effectively to disasters to mitigate their impacts.⁷⁷ However, lacking authorization to pivot district development budgets and without access to

contingency funds, there are limits to the response capacity of DDMCs.

6.2 EFFECTIVENESS OF COORDINATION STRUCTURES

The MRDPR’s National Disaster Risk Management Plan (NDRMP) 2022 includes the following vision statement: “a disaster-resilient Uganda capable to anticipate for and coping with all disaster risks.” During the plan’s development phase, which included government and non-government stakeholder involvement, key issues were identified that included:

- Limited staff capacity and skills within the OPM and at regional level;
- Lack of national and district disaster risk management funds to facilitate coordinate and action;
- Weak institutional capacity for the release of regular and timely harmonized early warning information by OPM and ministries to provide accurate and timely statistical disaster-related information and facts;
- Limited efforts towards mainstreaming disaster risk management into development planning at all levels;
- Lack of categorization of disaster and lack of clarity of the level of disasters to support decision-making and trigger response.

In response, the Plan recommended: an urgent review of disaster risk management (DRM) structures and staffing at all levels, a review of the current DRM policy, enactment of a DRM bill, release of funds to strengthen DRM capacity building, mainstreaming disaster risk reduction (DRR), establishment of a Government-led high-level strategic joint committee of all key stakeholders, establishment of regional hubs, and review of government-led response interventions.⁷⁸

The NDRMP was released in September 2022 and was immediately followed by UNICEF Uganda’s Karamoja Response Report (Number 6), that, as has been mentioned, confirmed a 140% increase in reported SAM admissions from January to August 2022. The release of the NDRMP therefore coincided with a long-standing, multi-hazard crisis.

⁷⁴ UNICEF, 2022b.

⁷⁵ UN Uganda, 2022.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Moroto District Local Government, 2021.

⁷⁸ OPM, 2022.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The current nutrition and health-focused “surge” response will doubtless contribute to saving lives in the sub-region. Alone, however, it will not avert the severe food security crisis and associated impacts on livelihoods that informants pointed to during the review, the result of a patchy harvest and hence inadequate food stocks, exacerbated by the export sale of grain. From the perspective of preventing malnutrition, it is evident that the community themselves prioritize livelihoods support such as livestock-related and income-generating activities,⁷⁹ yet such humanitarian support is currently minimal. District hazard-based contingency plans recognize this, but without funding and the support of international development partners, these plans will have limited impact. Furthermore, disaster risk will be further reduced when local government and NGOs are fully conversant with humanitarian standards for economic recovery (MERS) and livestock interventions (LEGS).

While it is evident that more could and should have been done to protect lives and livelihoods in Karamoja, informants make clear that raiding and insecurity are the primary drivers of the current crisis. Hence, until such time as this issue is addressed and people can again own, herd, and benefit from livestock, and access and cultivate and tend their gardens and fields without threat of violence, a meaningful humanitarian response is challenging. So too is the implementation of meaningful development programs and the associated development investment that are required to address Karamoja’s very high levels of multidimensional poverty. KRSU has recently released an assessment of the current conflict issues in Karamoja, with an emphasis on community perspectives on the causes, perpetrators, and solutions,⁸⁰ as well as a review of conflict trends and issues over time.⁸¹

Recognizing that Karamoja is experiencing a multi-hazard, multi-year humanitarian crisis, the result of a conflagration of high levels of multidimensional poverty, highly eroded household resilience levels, multiple local hazards, and deepening global economic and food crises, the review team offers the following recommendations to prevent a further deepening of the humanitarian crisis in Karamoja.

Humanitarian response and coordination:

- Rapidly expand and extend the mass screening and treatment of severely acute malnourished children—

under the age of 59 months—and mothers in all districts of the sub-region, through to the end of December 2023.

- Expand and extend the protection ration for households with a malnourished child to all sub-locations in the CSLZ.
- Undertake a food availability assessment for the forthcoming lean season. As required, extend the provision of a protective ration of food assistance to those in need.
- Establish a hybrid (in-person and online) Karamoja Emergency Committee, chaired/co-chaired by the Ministry of State for Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees and the Ministry for Karamoja Affairs, that meets every two weeks to coordinate the Karamoja Emergency Response. Each ministry to deploy a Senior Technical Expert in Karamoja to organize monthly in-person meetings in Kotido and Moroto for the northern and southern districts in the sub-region.

Governance and security:

- The Ministry for Karamoja Affairs, the Parliamentary Group, Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force, Uganda Police Force, and an independent conflict specialist facilitator form a new High-Level Peace and Reconciliation Taskforce to address raiding, roadside banditry, and excessive use of force by security organs. Among other responsibilities, the Taskforce will be responsible for bringing raiders, community leaders, traders, and security and local government personnel allegedly involved in commercial raiding to account. The Taskforce will report regularly to Government and every two months to an open forum in Kotido and Moroto.
- Representatives of the High-Level Taskforce meet counterparts in Kenya to pilot and institutionalize a Turkana transhumance system that requires Turkana pastoralists who are semi-permanently living in Moroto District to return to Kenya for a minimum of three months each year. Also, negotiations for a return to Ugandan rangelands are predicated on the storage of all weapons in Kenya

⁷⁹ e.g., see Catley et al., 2018.

⁸⁰ Arasio and Stites, 2022.

⁸¹ Stites, 2022.

7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

before the Turkana and their herds are facilitated to cross the international border.

- Relations with neighbors: large numbers of armed Turkana are semi-permanently based in Moroto District. Their bearing arms undermines Government efforts to disarm the sub-region.

and community groups to bulk and store food for sale within the sub-region.

- While listed as hazards, agricultural drought, crop diseases, and floods are better addressed through development programs. It is recommended development partners resource a 10-year regenerative agriculture project with the Nabuin Zonal Agricultural Research and Development Institute (NZARDI) and relevant NGOs to pilot regenerative farming practices appropriate for the CSLZ and “Green Belt.” If proven cost effective, good practice would be scale-up through mentoring support to agricultural extension staff and farmer groups.

Resilience:

- Development programs have substantial resources, but it is unclear if or how these resources are re-shaped during crisis years. In part this is the result of donor accounting processes that are inappropriate in fragile sub-regions such as Karamoja. It is recommended that donors review the objectives and activities of their programming in the light of the poor response to the current crisis and identify, pilot, and institutionalize more-flexible delivery mechanisms, including crisis modifiers.
- The Ministry for Karamoja Affairs, the Karamoja Parliamentary Group, Uganda Police Force, and an independent substance abuse expert form a joint Waragi Control Taskforce. The Taskforce would be responsible for ending the transport and sale of illegal alcohol in Karamoja and for engaging international development partners to expand alcohol support services to affected individuals and their families.
- The Ministry for Karamoja seeks international development partner support for a five-year pilot social protection program for the most vulnerable groups in the sub-region, one which incorporates lessons from other countries for emergency scaling.

Livestock support:

- Specialist livestock departments in government and international livestock organizations undertake a Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards (LEGS) initial assessment and use the participatory response identification matrix (PRIM) to develop sub-regional and district livestock recovery plans. To be supported, elders and communities at sub-county level would need to commit to an end to livestock raiding and to addressing all violations in customary courts.

Crop support:

- Government and international development partners collaborate to reduce and bring to an end the damaging export of cereals from the sub-region in poor and crisis years through support to local farmer

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ANNEX I: SCOPE OF WORK

A. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF ENGAGEMENT

The overall task is to conduct a real-time review of the current humanitarian crisis including:

1. Produce a timeline of key events and issues that contributed to the crisis, as well as early warning or other reports and the timing, type and scale of responses by the Government of Uganda and the aid community. Assess the timeliness, duration and likely impact of these responses.
2. Review the coordination of the humanitarian response in Karamoja, covering government, UN, donor and NGO leadership and platforms; assess the extent to which coordination was effective and supported a timely, coherent and appropriate response. Assess if and how responses support livelihoods and are integrated/ harmonized with ongoing development and resilience programmes.
3. Conduct a rapid review of the early warning system in Karamoja and assess its capacity to prompt timely and effective responses. Assess if and how ongoing development and resilience projects used crisis modifiers or similar funding mechanisms during the crisis.
4. Based on the review tasks above, make recommendations for strengthening the humanitarian response.

B. DESCRIPTION OF SERVICES

Service Provider will provide the following Services to Tufts University as part of this transaction:

The review will use a qualitative approach focusing on a review of reports and literature, and interviews with key informants in Kampala and Karamoja. The Karamoja Resilience Support Unit (“KRSU”) will assist the consultant by sourcing documents and co-producing a list of key informants. In Karamoja, the consultant will conduct interviews at community level, with locations suggested by the KRSU and depending on security and other issues.

C. DELIVERABLES

At the end of the project, Service Provider will have delivered the following Deliverables to Tufts:

1. Briefing to the Karamoja Development Partners Group, including PowerPoint presentation.
2. Draft review report to be submitted to the KRSU by October 21, 2022. The report should be no more than 30 pages in length (approximately 300 words/page), excluding preliminaries and annexes; it should include an executive summary of 2 to 3 pages.
3. Final review report to be submitted to the KRSU by October 31, 2022.
4. Learning Brief to be submitted to the KRSU by November 4, 2022.

ANNEX 2: ITINERARY

Date	Activity	Location
27 Sep-22	- Arrival - Entebbe and Kampala	Entebbe and Kampala
28 Sep-22	- Meeting KRSU Chief of Party - Mesfin Ayele	KRSU office, Kampala
29 Sep-22	- Meeting James Terjanian - Food Security and Livelihoods Coordinator, FAO, and co-Chair Karamoja Partners Development Group (KPDG) - Peter Amudo, Ministry for Karamoja Affairs - Meeting Tony Ameny, Assistant Commissioner, Programmes, Ministry for Karamoja Affairs - Meeting Hon. Albert Lokoru Kiyonga, Tepeth County and Hon. Hillary Lokwang, Ik County	KRSU office, Kampala KRSU office, Kampala Office of the Prime Minister Bougainviller Hotel
30 Sep-22	- Meeting - Sagar Koharel, Chief of Party - Apolou Project - Meeting - Hon. Anyakun Esther Davinia, Minister of State for Relief, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees - Meeting Mulu Tadele, Team Leader, Resilience Unit, USAID, and KPDG Chair	KRSU office, Kampala Office of the Prime Minister KRSU office, Kampala
1 Oct -22	- Travel to Karamoja	
2 Oct-22	- Meeting - Antje Becker-Benton, Managing Director, Behavior Change and Community Health, Save the Children US and Warren Parker, Public Health, and Communication Consultant with USAID's Apolou Project - Meeting - John Loumo, Karimojong elder	Mount Moroto Hotel Mount Moroto Hotel
3 Oct-22	- Meeting – Dr. Raphael Lotira, Senior Resilience Advisor and Vincent Lomuria, Field Coordinator - Meeting – Dr. Rossanigo and Rose Locham	KRSU Office Mount Moroto Hotel
4 Oct-22	- Meeting - Jacob Opio, Emergency Specialist Officer and Muzafaru Ssenyondo, Nutrition Officer, UNICEF - Meeting - Kumakech Oluba Charles, Chief Administrative Officer - Meeting - Janaan Edonu, Entomologist, District Agricultural Officer and Secretary, Karamoja Resilience Forum - Meeting - Bernadette Galana, Logistics and Procurement Officer, Cooperation and Development - Meeting - Dirk Ullerich, Team Leader, Welthungerhilfe (WHH), Karamoja - Meeting - Moses Ewayu, Project Officer, Karamoja Integrated Development Project - Meeting - Rose Nachualwal, Nutritionist, World Food Programme	UN compound CAO's office District Agriculture office C&D office WHH office KIDP office UN compound

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Date	Activity	Location
5 Oct -22	- Visit to Kaipeta village, Loputuk sub-county, Moroto District - Meetings - Margaret Abura and Paul Aleper, Board Members, Rupa Community Development Trust (RUCODET), Rup sub-county, Moroto District	Acherer Mount Moroto Hotel
6 Oct-22	- Visit to Kaethin, Loputuk sub-county, Moroto District - Meeting - Vincent Abura, Independent consultant and Project Officer with Karamoja University project	Kaethin Mount Moroto Hotel
7 Oct-22	- Travel to Nabilatuk - Visit to villages in Loachat sub-county - Meeting with Jovic Anyakun Paul - Principal Assistant Secretary, CAO's office; Omwany Okiror Stephen - Senior Agricultural Officer, Dr. Ssendagire David - Senior Veterinary Officer - Meeting with Environmental Christian Organisation (ECO) team Moses Lolem and Ashok Peace - Meeting with Caritas Project staff implementing the Nuyok USAID-funded project led by Catholic Relief Services (CRS). Staff included Angom Rose Meheret, Aceng Myriam, Owgo Vinicio, Lukol Grace, Achok Robert, and Kiru Simon Alasco - Meeting with Boniface Omara, Credit Field Training Officer, SASAKAWA	Loachat CAO's office ECO office Caritas office SASAKAWA office
8 Oct-22	- Visit to villages in Loachat sub-county - Travel to Moroto	Loachat
9 Oct-22	- Meeting - Kuno Albert, Vision for Africa International - Meeting - Bruce Turner, African Inland Mission	Africana Hotel Africana Hotel
10 Oct-22	- Travel to Dodoth - Meeting - Salume Amutos, Save the Children	Hotel
11 Oct-22	- Visits to Kalonyangiat, Kalapata sub-county - Visit to Sidok sub-country permagardens with Sarah Angom, Mercy Corps - Meeting - Innocent Ofwono, Jimmy Keem, Ivan Oridi - Save the Children - Meeting - Juliet Adutu and Godfrey Lesse, Mercy Corps - Meeting - Mariam Nakiwu and Alex Ochan, Andre Foods International (AFI) - Meeting - Lochor Susan, Hunger Fighters Uganda - Meeting - Paul Lolem, Human Resources, representing Chief Administrative Officer, Dodoth District	Sidok Mercy Corps office Mercy Corps office AFI office Hunger Fighters office CAO's office
12 Oct-22	- Visit to villages in Loyoro sub-county	Loyoro
14 Oct-22	- Travel to Moroto	

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Date	Activity	Location
15 Oct-22	- Meetings - KRSU staff, Moroto - Meeting - Thomas Putan, World Food Programme - Meeting - Dr. James Drew	KRSU office Mount Moroto Hotel Mount Moroto Hotel
16 Oct-22	- Moroto	
17 Oct-22	- Visit to Nadunget livestock market - Travel to Gulu (re-routed for a medical emergency)	Nadunget Gulu
18 Oct-22	- Travel to Kampala	Kampala
19 Oct-22	- Kampala	Kampala
20 Oct-22	- Debrief with KRSU staff	KRSU office
21 Oct-22	- Departure from Uganda	Kampala
22 Oct-22	- Arrival UK	Rudderless!

ANNEX 3: LOCATIONAL RAIDING TIMELINES

Year	Loputuk sub-county, Moroto District
2019	- Jie - Turkana raiding at Kobebe, Moroto District - Jie - Bokora raided Awi Engolengiro (Matheniko) at Apule - Matheniko conducted a retaliatory raid on Jie - Matheniko LC III- Loyomo - killed by the army - Jie - Bokora raided Matheniko at Lokali in Nadunget sub-county - Jie - Bokora raided Awi a Lolet Apauyo (Matheniko) at Losogolmen - Raids became widespread
2020	- Ngitome (Bokora) raided Awi a Lokol (Matheniko) at Nachakchak - Ngitome raided Ere a Lokochingole (Matheniko) at Kaipetar - Jie - Bokora raided Awi Ayopo (Matheniko) at Lobur Akwee - killed two people - Matheniko conducted a retaliatory raid on Bokora at Nasike protected kraal - Peterken, RDC Moroto impounded Matheniko animals to compensate Bokora. Matheniko youth report torture by the army - Guti, Army Commander impounded Matheniko animals to compensate Bokora
2021	- Ngitome raided Awi a Nangiro Lopachol at Nachakchak, taking many animals - Ngitome again raided Awi a Nangiro Lopachol - took 15 cows - Jie - Bokora raided Awi Arithae at Kaethin - injured an old woman - Jie - Bokora again raid raided Awi Arithae - Jie - Bokora raided Ere a Kitoile Apuun, at Nakadapo - took animals, burned ere, and killed one man - Jie - Bokora raided Ere Apalepan at Nawanatau - took animals, one raider killed - 2nd, 3rd, and 4th raid Ngitome raid at Ere Apalepan at Nawanatau

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Year	Lopotuk sub-county, Moroto District
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Matheniko raided Ngitome at Loramram market - took chickens and goats but no cows as Bokora had driven them towards Apeitolim - Matheniko raided Ngitome at Loluk - took cows - Ngitome followed with three retaliatory raids at Kaipetar - Ere a Lopus Akol - Ngitome raided Ere of Akol Lolepedei - killed one woman and took animals - Ngitome raided Ere of Lowalan - killed one man - Ngitome raided Awi Ayopo at Lobur Akwee - took goats
2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ngitome raided Ere Akwee - a protected kraal. One Ngitome raider killed, and gun recovered, no animals were taken - Ngitome conducted five raids at Eree Akwee, the protected kraal - Ngitome raided Ere Apaloriong four times at Atedewoi - Ngitome raided Ere Ayopo at Lobur Akwee - Ngitome raided Ere Apuun - killed one man - Ngitome raided Ere a Lolepedei - took goats - Ngitome raided Ere Akol Michael - took goats - Ngitome raided Ere a Lokol at Nachakchak - took chicken, goats, saucepans, clothes, bed sheets, and other household items. Women were beaten.

Year	Lolachat sub-county, Nabilatuk District
2019	- No conflict
2020	- No conflict
2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bokora raided cattle of Longole Alemkori at Nabilatuk; cattle taken, and an old man killed - Bokora raided cattle of Apanaluk at Nabwel and cattle taken. Apanaluk pursued his raided animals and was killed at Lorengechora together with an LDU. - Bokora raided cattle of Lopeyok Apangiriko at Lorukumo and one man killed - Bokora raided the cattle of Lokee Akwangole at Lorukumo. - Bokora raided cattle of Lobong Apaitangoriaat Nasinyonoit C. - Bokora raided cattle of Iriama Joseph at Nasinyonoit. - Bokora raided goats of Lokiru Marko at Lopwatagete; Lokiru and one man killed. - Bokora raided cattle at Ere a Nakuwam Ilimit at Lopwatagete.
2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bokora raided cattle of Lobong Apaitangoria at Nasinyonoit and calves taken. - Bokora raided cattle of Lokwakori at Nangamit – twice. - Bokora raided cattle of Engorok at Nangamit. - Bokora raided cattle of Locha Lokolisiya at Lokutot. - Bokora raided cattle of Apa Loowan at Lokutot. - Bokora raided cattle of Apariongat Loperu at Adengel. - Bokora raided cattle of Apalochoro at Namorulem and herder injured. - Bokora raided cattle of Lomokol Lochech at Lopwatagete. - Bokora raided cattle of Umo Peter at Lopeduru.

ANNEX 4: DISTRICT HUMANITARIAN DASHBOARDS

NABILATUK DISTRICT

Partner	Location of response	# of HHs supported	Items donated			Comments
			Maize flour (kgs)	Beans (kgs)	Others	
FAO	All sub-counties (S/Cs)	0	0	0	Support to DDMC	Support under PRO-Act project
WFP/AFI	All S/Cs	Selected vulnerable HHs, Community Based Supplementary Feeding Programme (CBSFP)	36 kgs/HH for three months	2.7 liters cooking oil	Cash transfer Ushs 30,000 to HH	Support to CBSFP
UNICEF	All S/Cs	0	0	0	Cash of Ushs 110 million	Support to nutritional intervention areas
CRS-Nuyok	Lolachat and Lorengedwat	997	0	0	Cash transfers US\$30	Selected HHs
Helping Hand for Relief and Development	Nabilatuk Town Council	400 HHs	10,000 kgs	2,000 kgs	Lato milk and biscuit, Plumpy-nut	Assorted items was meant to address nutrition
Air Tel Uganda	Nabilatuk Town Council, Nabilatuk and Kosike S/Cs	600 HHs	2,400 kgs	1,200 kgs	0	HH received 4 kgs of flour and 2 kgs of beans
Association of Physical Planners	Nabilatuk Town Council	16 HHs	160 kgs and 16 kgs/HH		½ liter cooking oil	
Donation from Chinese Government	Nabilatuk Health Center (HC)-IV, Lorengedwat and Lolachat HC-IIIs	TB/HIV patients			69 cartons of dates	Nutrition supplements
Total						

KAABONG DISTRICT

Implementing Partner	Location	Type of Response		Type of Beneficiary						Duration
		Food	In-kind	Children under 5	Children above 5	Lactating mothers/ pregnant women	Elderly	Disarmed warriors	Number of beneficiaries	
OPM	All parishes of Kaabong but to be decided by DDMC	10 mt of maize flour					Yes			One-off
		50 boxes of salt								
		40 cartons of soap								
Embassy of Arabia	Malnourished children	69 boxes of dates		Yes						One-off
OPM	All parishes, DDMC-led	190 kgs of maize grain					Yes			One-off
OPM	All parishes		9,650 goats					Yes		One-off
Miracle Centre Church	Lotim and Kalapata	Selected foodstuff					Yes			One-off

